The Value Paradox in Science:

From “Wertfreiheit” to Value-Conscious Inquiry

16.10.2025

Max Weber’s principle of Wertfreiheit (value freedom) rests on a paradox: the call for science to be value-free is itself a normative stance. In this blog post, we explore how this paradox plays out in management research and social science more broadly. Drawing on paradox theory and feminist philosophy of science, we argue for a “both/and” approach that recognizes the presence of values in scientific inquiry while calling for their explicit articulation. Treating value premises as propositions that can be queried, rather than left as latent assumptions, enables more reflexive, transparent, and socially engaged research.

Max Weber’s ideal of “Wertfreiheit,” the notion that science should remain free from values (Weber, 1922) has long structured thinking about objectivity in the social sciences. At face value, it promotes an ethos of neutrality in the study of social phenomena. But this aspiration is paradoxical: the claim that science ought to be value-free is itself a normative commitment.

This “Weberian paradox” becomes particularly salient today. In the face of climate crises, digital transformations, and growing social inequalities, scholars are increasingly expected not just to explain the world but to positively contributing towards change (George, Howard-Grenville, Joshi, & Tihanyi, 2016). The question is not simply whether values belong in science, but how they shape our reasoning, both consciously and unconsciously.

To examine this, we do not take a stance in favor of one camp or another. Rather, we start from an observation: across fields, researchers routinely operate with implicit assumptions about what counts as important, legitimate, or desirable. These assumptions often reflect entrenched disciplinary logics (e.g., efficiency and effectiveness in management and economics) and may go unacknowledged. Our aim is to explore how such embedded values can be surfaced, interrogated, and become themselves objects of inquiry.

From Binary Positions to Paradox Thinking

The debate on values in science is often framed as a dichotomy. One stereotypical view assumes that objectivity requires complete neutrality and detachment from normative claims. The other accepts that science is inevitably value-laden, driven by power, interests, and ideology. Both positions contain partial truths but also clear limitations.

Thinking about the problem in binary “either/or” terms is not helpful. As Hanisch (2024) argues, a strictly descriptive approach, without some sense of “what ought to be,” can miss the opportunity to engage with pressing societal questions. But uncritical value engagement can also reduce science to advocacy and runs the risk of introducing decontextualized, overly simple, or stylized prescriptions (Horner, Cornelissen, & Zundel, 2024). Paradox theory provides an alternative “both/and” perspective: rather than resolving the tension, it encourages us to work with it, acknowledging that science is both influenced by values and simultaneously capable of rigorous inquiry (Krautzberger & Tuckermann, 2024).

Toward Value-Conscious Science

One way forward is to reconceive values not as threats to objectivity, but as testable, challengeable premises. Herbert Simon (1964) describes goals as “value premises that can serve as inputs to decisions” (p. 2). Following this, we might view value premises in science not as ideological commitments to be avoided, but as propositions that can (and should) be scrutinized (Rolin, 2017). For instance, much of management theory assumes that private ownership is the most effective way to organize resources. Framed as a proposition, this latent value premise could be tested by comparing privately owned, cooperatively owned, and publicly owned organizations.

In fact, feminist philosophers of science such as Longino (1990) and Oreskes (2019) have long argued that knowledge is never produced by data alone but also by background assumptions and values. Rather than sliding into relativism, they propose mechanisms to make these assumptions visible and contestable. Longino’s notion of “transformative criticism” emphasizes diverse communities of inquiry, where competing perspectives test the robustness of claims by surfacing hidden biases (e.g., whether studies of digital transformation assume that technological progress is inherently desirable). Oreskes similarly stresses that transparency and pluralism enhance reliability, since disclosing assumptions invites broader scrutiny. Building on this, we suggest that social science could treat value premises as defeasible propositions, i.e., statements open to empirical and normative challenge. For example, the widespread assumption that quantifying organizational performance through standardized indicators inherently benefits management can be surfaced to better understand its psychological and organizational consequences (e.g., Muller, 2018).

Paradox Management in Scholarly Practice

How might this work in practice? We propose four simple principles:

1. Reflexivity: Researchers can sharpen their own awareness of how disciplinary norms and personal experiences shape their questions, methods, and interpretations. This involves cultivating a habit of epistemic self-awareness, or what Weber called the “interpretive understanding” (Verstehen) of meaning-laden action.
2. Transparency: Journals, research institutions, and funding bodies might encourage the disclosure of value premises alongside methodological protocols. This practice can prompt scholars to more carefully reflect on their own assumptions and help readers understand the critical premises underlying the research.
3. Pluralism: Openness to diverse viewpoints enhances scrutiny, but pluralism has limits. It should be bounded by ethical standards (e.g., human dignity, scientific integrity), and evaluated through inclusive deliberation, not by endorsing all views, but by exposing and debating them.
4. Contestability: Values can be treated as propositions. For example, “Policies reducing emissions are societally preferable” can be empirically examined and normatively debated. This reframes values as propositions that invite justification, not dogma.

Authors

References →